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INTRODUCTION
Zoning is the quintessential wicked problem. Professors Rittel
and Webber, writing in the 1970s, identified as “wicked” those problems
that technocratic expertise cannot necessarily solve.1 Wicked problems
arise when the very definition of the problem is contested and outcomes
are not measured by “right and wrong” but rather by messier contests
between winners and losers.2 This accurately characterizes the state of
zoning and land use today.
Zoning is under vigorous and sustained attack from all sides.
Conservatives have long decried regulatory interference with private
development rights.3 More recently, progressive housing advocates
have begun to criticize zoning for making thriving cities unaffordable

*
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Elisabeth H. & Granville S. Ridley, Jr. Chair in
Law, Vanderbilt Law School. Zachary Gitman provided research assistance.
1.
Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4
POL’Y SCIS. 155, 160–62 (1973).
2.
Id. at 160–69.
3.
See, e.g., Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 719, 722 (1980)
(“[W]e should try the alternative of less regulation and a better delivery system . . . .”); Orlando E.
Delogu, Local Land Use Controls: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 36 ME. L. REV. 261, 263 (1984)
(“[Land use] controls cut against the grain of our historical penchant to allow people (property
owners) the freedom to use their property as they choose.”); Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land
Use: An Alternative Free Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 30–31 (1981)
(contending that a free enterprise system of land development would be superior to the status quo
because it would “confine government to the role of preserving order and fundamental liberties”).
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and for exacerbating racial segregation.4 Environmentalists argue that
zoning is responsible for urban sprawl and for increasing carbon
emissions.5 Economists blame zoning for restricting residential
mobility, which limits fluidity in labor markets and thereby reduces the
agglomeration surplus that thriving places like New York and San
Francisco should be producing.6 And these are just some of the concerns.
The breadth of these criticisms reveals the multiplicity of issues
implicated by modern zoning—from the balance of public power and
private rights, to distributional concerns, environmental interests,
economic efficiency, and externalities along many dimensions. Most do
not admit of a single “right” answer. Zoning is a wicked problem, indeed.
In true “wicked” fashion, it is difficult even to explore answers
because of the predictable and entrenched interests in almost any
zoning dispute. Invariably, efforts to loosen zoning restrictions in order
to increase density will face fierce opposition from nearby neighbors
who oppose change—so-called NIMBYs (“Not in My Back Yard”) or
Neighborhood Defenders.7 Such neighbors typically object to changes to
the character of their community, increased burdens on local
infrastructure, changing demographics, community affordability, and
change for its own sake.

4.
See, e.g., Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, Barriers to Shared
Growth: The Case of Land Use Regulation and Economic Rents 1 (Nov. 20, 2015), https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20151120_barriers_shared_growth_land_us
e_regulation_and_economic_rents.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TEW-JGF5] (“In today’s remarks, I will
focus on how excessive or unnecessary land use or zoning regulations have consequences that go
beyond the housing market to impede mobility and thus contribute to rising inequality and
declining productivity growth.”); Paul Krugman, Opinion, Inequality and the City, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/30/opinion/inequality-and-the-city.html
[https://perma.cc/8TAA-MNL9] (“Yes, [zoning] is an issue on which you don’t have to be a
conservative to believe that we have too much regulation.”); Matthew Yglesias, You Can’t Talk
Housing Costs Without Talking About Zoning, SLATE (Dec. 10, 2013, 8:50 AM), https://slate.com/
business/2013/12/housing-costs-it-s-the-zoning-stupid.html
[https://perma.cc/TAV6-TL9P]
(describing the relationship between zoning and housing supply).
5.
See SMART GROWTH IN A CHANGING WORLD (Jonathan Barnett ed., 2007); see also Michael
P. Johnson, Environmental Impacts of Urban Sprawl: A Survey of the Literature and Proposed
Research Agenda, 33 ENV’T & PLAN. A 717, 721–23 (2001) (reviewing research regarding the
environmental impacts of urban sprawl); TRANSP. RSCH. BD., NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L
ACADS., DRIVING AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT: THE EFFECTS OF COMPACT DEVELOPMENT ON
MOTORIZED TRAVEL, ENERGY USE, AND CO2 EMISSIONS 144–84 (2009) (arguing that land
development patterns lead to increased automobile usage, thereby increasing greenhouse
gas emissions).
6.
See, e.g., Wendell Pritchett & Shitong Qiao, Exclusionary Megacities, 91 S. CALIF. L. REV.
467, 469 (2018) (“Human beings should live in places where they are most productive, and
megacities, where information, innovation, and opportunities congregate, would be the optimal
choice.” (footnotes omitted)).
7.
See KATHERINE LEVINE EINSTEIN, DAVID M. GLICK & MAXWELL PALMER, NEIGHBORHOOD
DEFENDERS: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS AND AMERICA’S HOUSING CRISIS 4, 34 (2020).
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The resulting fights can be knock-down, drag-out affairs.
Existing residents often oppose change as if the very survival of the
neighborhood and community were at stake. Development proponents
respond with accusations of “opportunity hoarding,” selfishness, and
sometimes racism.8 Zoning is the battleground, and both sides act as if
it reflects a zero-sum binary choice: more development or less,
neighborhood transformation or preservation. It does not have to be this
way. Both sides in these fights misapprehend the role that zoning can
play in mediating these disputes. Zoning need not be either pro-growth
or anti-growth. Instead, when properly understood and applied, zoning
is a tool to moderate the pace of neighborhood change.9
In the wicked problems literature, incremental change is viewed
as a necessary compromise when problems are insurmountably
complex. Where problems cannot be solved wholesale, actors are
advised at least to whittle away.10 Yet some scholars argue that a
wicked problem, by definition, is not amenable to incremental change.11
One of the characteristics that makes problems “wicked” is their
dynamic response to interventions, making piecemeal solutions
impossible.12 But zoning should be viewed differently. Slow,
incremental change is not a compromise because holistic solutions are
impossible. Rather, it appropriately balances the interests of neighbors
and newcomers; it is the best approach to neighborhood change, not a
necessary evil. Understanding the importance of the pace of change
ratchets down the stakes of zoning disputes and suggests a new
conception of municipal land use regulations.
8.
See, e.g., RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS: HOW THE AMERICAN UPPER MIDDLE
CLASS I S LEAVING EVERYONE ELSE IN THE DUST, WHY THAT I S A PROBLEM, AND WHAT TO D O ABOUT
IT 95–98, 102–05 (2017) (“The rise of ‘exclusionary zoning,’ designed to protect the home values,
schools, and neighborhoods of the affluent, has badly distorted the American property market.”);
see also Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Inclusion, Exclusion, and the “New” Economic Inequality, 94 TEX.
L. REV. 1647, 1655 (2016) (describing “opportunity hoarding”). For an eight-bit cartoon
demonstration of the phenomenon, see Carrie Engel, Play the Dream Hoarders Game, BROOKINGS:
BROOKINGS NOW (July 13, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/07/13/playthe-dream-hoarders-game/ [https://perma.cc/D6R8-M26R].
9.
See Christopher Serkin, A Case for Zoning, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(arguing that the purpose of modern zoning is to constrain the pace of neighborhood change).
10. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive
Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 65 (2010)
(“The Court’s observation that agencies have to whittle away at some problems is no doubt
accurate . . . .”).
11. See Falk Daviter, Coping, Taming or Solving: Alternative Approaches to the Governance
of Wicked Problems, 38 POL’Y STUD. 571, 583 (2017) (“In the face of certain types of risks, for
example, a strategy of incremental adjustments and reconstructive analysis may be ill-advised if
it means to accept potentially irreversible repercussions.”).
12. See, e.g., Ian Sanderson, Intelligent Policy Making for a Complex World: Pragmatism,
Evidence and Learning, 57 POL. STUD. 699, 705–06 (2009) (describing how complex systems cannot
be understood by decomposing them to their constituent elements).
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Many people seem to think that the goal of zoning is to identify
optimal land development patterns and then regulate towards those
outcomes.13 Disputes are then over the ultimate vision of the
community and the density and intensity of allowable land uses.14 But
change that happens slowly actually imposes fewer costs on neighbors
than the same change over a shorter period of time. Slow, deliberate,
incremental change interferes less with people’s expectations than does
rapid, dramatic change—even if the end result is the same.15
Neighborhood evolution affects people differently depending on the
speed at which it occurs.
Giving neighbors time for their expectations to shift
incrementally can reduce the disruption caused by new development.
Neighbor opposition to new projects is often vehement. Protests,
community activism, and even litigation may try to stop a development
in its tracks.16 But if the development happens, it may blend relatively
quickly into the community background.17 People’s expectations shift,
and what was once an affront to the character of the community can
become a welcome addition, or at least part of the unnoticed
background. Even more importantly, neighbor opposition to new
development is sometimes based less on objections to the specific project
than on concerns that it represents a kind of slippery slope. It is not the
particular project that threatens the community but rather the
additional changes that it foreshadows.18
Zoning, when properly implemented and designed, should give
communities time to absorb changes gradually and should provide
reassurance to neighbors that one new project will not trigger other new
ones too quickly. But zoning should facilitate change and not lock in the
status quo. In other words, using zoning to moderate the pace of
community change can act as a lubricant to some development by
13. See Christopher Serkin & Gregg P. Macey, Post-zoning: Alternative Forms of Public Land
Use Controls, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 305, 307–08 (2013) (describing ecological origins of “end-state”
planning); see also Eric R. Claeys, Essay, Euclid Lives? The Uneasy Legacy of Progressivism in
Zoning, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 750 (2004) (“Because Progressives measured a city’s well being
by the extent to which it was planned in advance, they saw nineteenth-century regulation as an
invitation to anarchy.”).
14. See Serkin & Macey, supra note 13, at 308.
15. See Christopher Serkin, Property and Change (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
16. See infra notes 138–141 and accompanying text (describing opposition to development of
Barclays Center in Brooklyn).
17. See infra notes 142–144 and accompanying text (describing the subsequent community
acceptance of the Barclays Center in Brooklyn).
18. Cf. Chinese Staff & Workers Ass’n v. City of New York, 502 N.E.2d 176, 180–81 (N.Y.
1986) (upholding challenged environmental review of development on grounds that the city failed
to consider likely changes in the neighborhood as a result).
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lowering the stakes for community opposition and protecting incumbent
expectations. People should not expect zoning to prevent change, but
people can reasonably expect that changes will happen at an
appropriate pace.
Part I describes the current uses and justifications for zoning
and reveals the profound disagreements at the heart of land use
regulations today. Part II explores how slow, incremental change
minimizes zoning’s interference with expectations. Part III identifies
specific land use tools and doctrines that can help to minimize
disruption by controlling the pace of community change.
I. THE WICKED PROBLEM OF ZONING
A. Historical Uses and Justifications of Zoning
Zoning in the United States began in the first quarter of the
twentieth century as a seemingly technocratic exercise in urban and
suburban design.19 It was an era marked by increasing confidence in
scientific and social scientific pursuits of rational order in the world.20
Early planners, motivated in part by ecology and its embrace of “end
state” planning, promoted a vision of a well-ordered city.21 They
championed the view that ecological change was progressing to a
“climax state” of perfect equilibrium.22 They thought the same was true
of urban design and that cities would evolve to some climax state where
everything was in its optimal place.23 Zoning was intended to
implement that goal.24
Zoning, as developed and promulgated by the Commerce
Department in the 1920s, provided a blueprint for local governments to
divide their municipalities into different zones that prescribed
maximum uses and densities. 25 The Standard Zoning Enabling Act
19. See Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 15 (2003) (describing Herbert Hoover’s
support of and collaborations with planning professionals).
20. See Claeys, supra note 13, at 750 (discussing the influence of Progressive ideology
on zoning).
21. Serkin & Macey, supra note 13, at 307–08; see also John Mixon & Kathleen McGlynn, A
New Zoning and Planning Metaphor: Chaos and Complexity Theory, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1221, 1247
(2006) (“Land use planning that postulates a terminal state of affairs—a defined land use future—
may be as likely, or even more likely, to produce adverse consequences as to produce an
ideal environment.”).
22. Serkin & Macey, supra note 13, at 307–08.
23. Id. at 308.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, The Quiet Revolution and Federalism: Into the Future, 45 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 266–67 (2012).
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(SZEA) provides zoning’s fundamental DNA. It created “use districts”
consisting of broad categories—residential, commercial, and
industrial—and then subcategories specifying different intensities of
uses—single-family, duplex, multifamily, and so forth.26 In addition, it
defined “bulk” limits, like maximum height limits, lot coverage, and
setbacks from property lines, all of which combine to define buildable
envelopes.27 The goal was a neatly organized city, segregated by use,
with people living in one area, working in another, and shopping in still
another. Moreover, the system was designed to privilege uses in an
explicit hierarchy, with single-family residential zones at the top and
industrial uses at the very bottom.28
Zoning’s early defenders focused on zoning as a kind of ex ante
nuisance prevention.29 The goal, very explicitly, was to use planning
expertise to prevent conflicting uses of land before they arose. 30 The
1920s were a time of industrialization and urbanization, and the
traditional judicial remedy of nuisance law seemed ill suited to the
intensity of the new land use conflicts. By preventing those conflicts
ahead of time and assigning uses to the places where they were best
suited, zoning aimed at efficiency.31
Consistent with the evolution of wicked problems in other fields,
this faith in technocratic efficiency seems entirely anachronistic today.
The traditional vision of zoning has as much in common with modern
land use controls as It’s a Wonderful Life has in common with modern
banking.32 Of course, zoning still plays an important role in keeping
noxious uses—gas stations, factories, adult businesses—out of bucolic
residential settings. But local governments increasingly favor walkable
mixed-use neighborhoods that combine residential and commercial
uses.33 Complex overlays, whether for historic preservation or urban
26. Id. at 265; see also Claeys, supra note 13, at 739–40 (“Euclidean zoning institutes a
centralized, command-and-control style of land-use regulation. It operates on the principle, ‘a place
for everything, and everything in its place.’ ”).
27. See, e.g., SONIA A. HIRT, ZONED IN THE USA: THE ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
AMERICAN LAND-USE REGULATION 32 (2014) (describing original zoning limits).
28. See Gerald A. Fischer, The Comprehensive Plan Is an Indispensable Compass for
Navigating Mixed-Use Zoning Decisions Through the Precepts of the Due Process, Takings, and
Equal Protection Clauses, 40 URB. LAW. 831, 835–36 (2008) (describing a cumulative “pyramid”
system of zoning with single-family classification the highest use).
29. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (describing zoning
as excluding structures and practices likely to cause nuisances).
30. Id. at 394–95 (detailing the benefits of zoning considered by commissions).
31. See, e.g., Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1724 (2015)
(“[Z]oning laws restrict development before it results in unwanted burdens on neighbors, while
nuisance suits impose liability after the damage has begun.”).
32. IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946).
33. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32–
33 (2004) (“The new urbanists champion dense, ‘mixed use’ neighborhoods . . . .”); Brian W. Ohm
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design specification, impose different sets of land use goals on top of
traditional zoning.34 And local governments today deploy zoning as a
mechanism for fiscal purposes, incorporating exactions and impact fees
that force developers to pay for infrastructure improvements as a
condition for land use approvals.35
In classic wicked-problem fashion, even the goals of zoning are
increasingly contested, and conflicts between various stakeholders have
come to dominate current debates about zoning: between insiders and
outsiders and between environmentalists and proponents of historic
preservation, among many others.36 Simply unpacking these disparate
interests and conflicts reveals the complexity—the wickedness—of the
zoning problem.37
Zoning began with a focus on idealized end-state goals:
implementing technocratic planning and preventing land use conflicts
before they arise.38 Those objectives were complementary and existed
as a kind of aspirational point that everyone could agree was zoning’s
target. As faith in technocratic solutions began to wane, zoning’s
objectives increased from one- to two-dimensional but still could be
spread relatively neatly along a single line from prodevelopment to
antidevelopment. Harvey Molotch argued in 1976 that many local
governments—and their zoning functions—were controlled by a
“growth machine,” which included the developers, architects, real
estate brokers, lawyers, and anyone else with a direct economic stake

& Robert J. Sitkowski, The Influence of New Urbanism on Local Ordinances: The Twilight of
Zoning?, 25 URB. LAW. 783, 785 (2003) (asserting that new urbanists identified “the failure of
Euclidean zoning to allow for mixed-uses”).
34. See generally Dorothy Ariail, Property Topics and Concepts, AM. PLAN. ASS’N,
https://www.planning.org/divisions/planningandlaw/propertytopics.htm#Overlay (last visited
Sept. 14, 2020) [https://perma.cc/25TC-XZ68].
35. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, VICKI L. BEEN, RODERICK M. HILLS & CHRISTOPHER SERKIN,
LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 647, 670 (4th ed. 2013) (“[I]n most jurisdictions,
public land use regulation has evolved into a system of fiscal protection and fund-raising.”).
36. See infra Part I.B (detailing conflicts among modern approaches to zoning).
37. In their seminal piece, Rittel and Webber focus on urban policy as a wicked problem.
Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 158. That seems like a broader frame than zoning, but, in fact,
the most intractable disputes in urban policy map perfectly on to land use and zoning disputes.
Focusing specifically on zoning reveals one of the central features of wicked problems, that the
definition of the problem is in constant and recursive conversation with solutions, both of which
are contested. As Rittel and Webber put it, “The information needed to understand [a wicked]
problem depends on one’s idea for solving it.” Id. at 161. Here, to frame problems of urban policy
as zoning problems is already to narrow it and to suggest a large but limited range of solutions
(land use reform), at the expense of others (social safety net, tax policy, antitrust reform, etc.). But
zoning is wicked enough and reveals the same trajectory and complexity as a classic
wicked problem.
38. See Galle, supra note 31, at 1724 (explaining that zoning restricts land use to
prevent nuisances).
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in growth and development. 39 This translated into a relatively
straightforward opposition to regulatory barriers to development.
On the other end of the spectrum were antidevelopment local
governments. William Fischel drew a sharp distinction between
municipalities dominated by the Molotch Growth Machine and those
dominated by what he called “homevoters”—that is, homeowners who
vote.40 Quintessentially, these were exclusionary suburbs that became
the destination of white flight from the urban core.41 Homevoters crave
stability, if not stasis, both because of the mini cartel the status quo
creates for existing housing stock (increasing property values) and also
because of a more generalized and sometimes pernicious resistance to
changes to community character.42 Zoning is the primary regulatory
mechanism for resisting growth and change.
B. Contemporary Uses of Zoning
Zoning is still sometimes viewed as a zero-sum battleground
between progrowth and antigrowth factions.43 But the objectives of
zoning have become much more diverse than this simple twodimensional spectrum. Moreover, the “planning” model of zoning has
increasingly been replaced by a “dealing” model, where zoning is the
regulatory context for increasingly sophisticated negotiations between
developers and local officials.44 In a dealing model, the zoning of any
particular parcel should be seen as a kind of opening offer that is subject
to change if the developer can offer enough inducement.45 The resulting
39. Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place, 82
AM. J. SOCIO. 309, 309–10 (1976).
40. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 80–81 (2001).
41. Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 635 (2002) (reviewing FISCHEL,
supra note 40, at 80–81) (describing exclusionary practices in “homevoter” jurisdictions).
42. See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 40, at 80–82 (showing how homevoters were able to combat
rent control).
43. See, e.g., Daniel Hertz, Homevoters v. the Growth Machine, CITYCOMMENTARY (June 11,
2018), https://cityobservatory.org/homevoters-v-growth-machine/ [https://perma.cc/C6AN-648W]
(describing competing pro-growth and anti-growth pressures).
44. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 890–91 (1983); see also Steven J. Eagle, Land Use Regulation
and Good Intentions, 33 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 87, 105–09 (2017) (describing how “[t]he
movement away from long-term comprehensive planning and Euclidean zoning” effected a rise in
“schemes to facilitate land use planning and bargaining”); Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and
Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 337, 347–49 (2002) (“[C]urrent practices demonstrate that land use decisionmaking has shifted significantly from the planned toward the particularized . . . .”).
45. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, Divergence in Land Use Regulations and Property Rights,
92 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1065 (2019) (“Under the dealing model, land use regulations should be
seen as a kind of opening offer.”).
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landscape is much more complex. These are not zero-sum tradeoffs but
instead orthogonal policy concerns.
To bring some order to the chaos, it is possible to discern several
overarching categories of municipal motivations for zoning: planning,
municipal finance, market interventions, preservation, and exclusion.46
But subcategories tell the real story of disparate policy goals. Not every
community pursues each of the goals below, nor are they (for the most
part) mutually exclusive. Moreover, municipalities sometimes pursue
different dichotomous goals in different neighborhoods. This list is not
exhaustive, but it is meant to capture the most common municipal
objectives. They will be immediately familiar to most people and will
reveal the wickedness of the zoning problem.
Planning
1. Separating incompatible uses. Zoning retains at least vestiges
of its origins in ex ante nuisance prevention. According to a traditional
planning model, zoning promotes efficiency by preventing conflicts
before they arise and avoiding the deadweight costs of litigation.47
2. Rational planning. Urban planners—whose plans usually
serve as the basis for zoning—are faced with much broader
considerations than simply preventing land use conflicts among
neighbors. The search for rational development includes such
considerations as infrastructure planning and the appropriateness of
different places for different uses. 48 Zoning, then, reflects the policy
choices of planners and local officials seeking to promote certain kinds
of development or businesses in certain places in order to promote a
rational city. For example, transit-oriented development, or increased
density on arterial roads, is consistent with this objective.49
3. Satisfying consumer preferences. Rational development may
not be appealing development to housing consumers. For example, culde-sacs make for terrible urban design. They impede traffic, make police
46. In previous work, I have identified the most common goals as minimizing harm from
neighbors, promoting new design forms, encouraging growth, discouraging growth, fiscal zoning,
zoning as bargaining, zoning to increase property values, affordability, historic preservation,
community preservation, aesthetic regulation, environmental protection of various sorts, economic
intervention, and exclusion and segregation. See id., at 1075.
47. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (discussing zoning’s
early rationale as a form of ex ante nuisance prevention).
48. See, e.g., ALEXANDER GARVIN, THE AMERICAN CITY: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T 3–4 (2d
ed. 2002) (discussing public investment in infrastructure as well as size and character regulations
as typical of urban planning).
49. See Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth and Sustainable Transportation: Can We Get
There from Here?, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1529, 1539 (2002) (describing a more sustainable
approach to transportation that focuses on accessibility and livability as part of a “smart growth”
development policy).
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and fire protection more difficult, and can interfere with creating
walkable places.50 Planners are usually opposed to cul-de-sacs,51 but
housing consumers often love them.52 Property values in cul-de-sacs are
systemically higher precisely because of the lack of cut-through traffic
and the sense of neighborhood control over streets. 53 The divergence
between planning goals and housing consumer goals is a theme in the
land use and planning literature.54 The point here is that zoning aspires
sometimes to the goals of planning and sometimes to the goals of
consumers, and the two are not necessarily the same.
Municipal Finance
4. Tax revenue. Zoning can also be implemented to try to enhance
local tax revenue, which means attracting uses that produce the
greatest net fiscal benefits to a local government.55 Translating this into
policy depends on local context. In places where property taxes are
capped, for example, local officials may try to attract more commercial
uses that generate sales tax. Most local governments depend primarily
on property taxes, however, and maximizing tax revenue often means
trying to restrict or exclude inexpensive multifamily housing. 56 In
purely fiscal terms, lower-income households with children who attend
local public schools are often net negatives for local governments;
whereas, wealthy empty nesters in expensive houses are net positives.57

50. See, e.g., Paul Cozens & David Hillier, The Shape of Things to Come: New Urbanism, the
Grid and the Cul-De-Sac, 13 INT’L PLAN. STUD. 51, 51 (2008) (arguing that gird layouts enhance
walkability more than cul-de-sac layouts); Paul K. Asabere, The Value of Neighborhood Street with
Reference to the Cul-De-Sac, 3 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 185, 186 (1990) (indicating that cul-desacs reduce pedestrian traffic and make maneuvering for fire department vehicles more difficult).
51. See, e.g., Paul Cozens & David Hillier, supra note 50, at 51.
52. See Paul K. Asabere, supra note 50, at 191 (finding positive property values associated
with cul-de-sac street layout).
53. Id. at 186, 191.
54. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Freedom—A Suggested Analysis, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1325
(1955) (observing that planning footpaths in advance removes the opportunity to see where
residents will walk most often); John Rahenkamp, Land Use Management: An Alternative to
Controls, in FUTURE LAND USE: ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 191, 191–92
(Robert W. Burchell & David Listokin eds., 1975) (arguing that planners are historically bad at
predicting consumer behavior).
55. See Eric A. Hanushek & Kuzey Yilmaz, Land-Use Controls, Fiscal Zoning, and the Local
Provision of Education, 43 PUB. FIN. REV. 559, 563–67 (2015) (discussing how localities often make
zoning choices in order to increase their tax base to fund public services such as education).
56. See Serkin, supra note 45, at 1064–65 (explaining that local governments seek to
minimize low-income households due to the burden on municipal services).
57. See Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting Exclusionary Zoning in Its Place:
Affordable Housing and Geographical Scale, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1667, 1670 (2013) (describing
how wealthier property owners’ higher property taxes implicitly subsidize public services for lowincome families).
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The mix of land uses in a municipality will have a significant impact on
its tax base, its expenditures, and therefore its bottom line.
5. Fees and exactions. In addition to tax revenue, land use
regulation can have a more direct impact on municipal finances by
producing fees and exactions.58 Exactions are conditions that a local
government imposes before granting permission to develop property,
and they vary widely in form.59 For example, a local government may
require certain infrastructure improvements or abatement of certain
impacts before allowing development to proceed. These improvements
can include street or stormwater upgrades, investments in transit, or
even development of new schools, in addition to direct cash payments.60
The Constitution limits exactions by requiring them to be related to,
and proportional to, the burden being imposed by the new
development.61 In other words, a local government cannot extort money
from developers, but it can force them to internalize the marginal cost
of the development on municipal services and infrastructure. In so
doing, a local government can shift the costs of growth from insiders—
existing property owners who would pay through increases in property
taxes—to newcomers and outsiders, who pay in the form of higher
housing costs.62
Market Interventions
6. Increasing property values. One of the self-interested reasons
that in-place property owners may want to restrict growth is to increase
local property values.63 By definition, zoning operates as a restriction
on supply, which tends to increase housing costs, all else being equal.64
The effect of zoning on property values is deeply dependent on context.
Sometimes attracting development is necessary to spur investment or

58. Serkin, supra note 45, at 1065–66.
59. See Jim Rossi & Christopher Serkin, Energy Exactions, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 643, 654–
58 (2019) (describing the use of exactions).
60. See id. at 658 (“Other common legislated exactions in other jurisdictions include fees for
schools, wastewater, parks, and fire departments, to name just a few.”).
61. See id. at 703–04 (describing constitutional limits on exactions).
62. See Serkin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 31–32) (on file with author) (describing the use
of zoning to shift costs of growth).
63. See FISCHEL, supra note 40, at 6 (explaining how concern for home values leads home
owners to advocate for and against zoning changes); see also Christopher Serkin, Big Differences
for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1648
(2006) (stating that because a home is often a person’s most significant financial asset,
homeowners are incentivized to police local government land use decisions).
64. See Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, Zoning’s Steep Price, 25 REG. 24, 26 (2002)
(finding evidence that zoning is responsible for high housing costs in certain markets); see also Rolf
Pendall, Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain of Exclusion, 66 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 125, 129,
138 (2000) (describing how zoning laws can increase housing costs and exclude minority groups).

1890

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:6:1879

reinvestment in a place.65 But there is no question that zoning plays an
important role in enhancing local property values, and indeed for some,
that quality is its central animating purpose.66
7. Promoting affordability. For others, the opposite goal is more
important: zoning to promote affordability.67 Affordability can be
addressed directly within a zoning ordinance. For example,
inclusionary zoning can require or incentivize the production of
affordable housing units as part of the development of market-rate
units.68 But zoning can also encourage affordability simply by loosening
development restrictions and unlocking additional supply. 69
8. Economic Protectionism. Local governments can also use
zoning to favor (or disfavor) particular businesses or economic interests.
Efforts to exclude large box stores—the Wal-Mart Wars70— are
emblematic of efforts to protect downtown businesses. Other cases are
legion, from excluding new office buildings to protect owners of existing
vacant office space, to prohibitions of all kinds of uses coupled with
grandfathering protection for those that already exist.71
Preservation
9. Historic preservation. Historic preservation has become an
abiding concern of land use regulations, if not zoning per se. 72 Historic
65. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 513–14 (1991) (describing local
efforts to attract new development).
66. See, e.g., John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 93
(2014) (describing relationship between supply restrictions and price).
67. See, e.g., KEITH WARDRIP, LAURA WILLIAMS & SUZANNE HAGUE, CTR. FOR HOUS. POL’Y,
THE ROLE OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN CREATING JOBS AND STIMULATING LOCAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 10–13 (2011), https://providencehousing.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/Housing-and-Economic-Development-Report-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/
SN7E-V83E] (indicating that localities may consider the promotion of affordable housing when
making zoning decisions).
68. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, The New Politics of New Property and the Takings Clause,
42 VT. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2017) (stating that many liberal scholars and policymakers advocate for
zoning that increases population density and prevents gentrification).
69. Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen & Katherine O’Regan, Supply Skepticism: Housing Supply
and Affordability, 29 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 25, 29 (2018).
70. See ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 120–21 (providing a legal history of the Wal-Mart
Wars); see also DAVID PORTER & CHESTER L. MIRSKY, MEGAMALL ON THE HUDSON: PLANNING,
WAL-MART, AND GRASSROOTS RESISTANCE (2003) (examining one community’s efforts to prevent
construction of a Wal-Mart); William E. Roper & Elizabeth Humstone, Wal-Mart in Vermont—The
Case Against Sprawl, 22 VT. L. REV. 755, 758 (1998) (describing efforts to prevent the building of
a Wal-Mart in the Town of St. Albans, Vermont).
71. See, e.g., Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988)
(excluding new office building to protect existing office buildings from competition); Christopher
Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1223–24
(2009) (describing the dynamics surrounding legal protections for existing uses).
72. See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 45, at 1068–69 (describing historic preservation).
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preservation is often a separate regulatory regime, although historic
overlays and other designations are sometimes built into zoning
ordinances.73 Whatever the mechanism, local governments often seek
to protect historic buildings and neighborhoods and so prevent their
destruction or redevelopment.74
11. Community preservation. Historic preservation is often a
proxy for community preservation. That is, some local governments
preserve buildings or neighborhoods regardless of their actual historical
value because what they genuinely care about is resisting change. In
some states, local governments have a mechanism to accomplish this
directly through the designation of community preservation districts.75
More commonly, local governments create a historic overlay on a
neighborhood that they are trying to protect from redevelopment—not
so much for the history of the place but instead to make it more difficult
to subdivide and redevelop.76
13. Environmental preservation. Local governments also use
zoning and land use regulations to preserve open space and to protect
the environment. This can take two different, and often conflicting,
forms. More conventionally, zoning ordinances would designate swaths
of property for low-density uses in order to preserve vegetation, fields,
or other vulnerable habitats.77 In previous work, I dubbed this
“aesthetic environmentalism,” which seeks primarily to preserve the
feel of a place as rural instead of urban or suburban. 78 Increasingly,
however, people have realized that strict density limits meant to
preserve open space often result in sprawl. Preserving one place as
relatively rural means pushing development elsewhere, often further
from jobs and into places where commutes increase.79 The end result is
an increase in vehicle miles traveled and carbon emissions, which is
decidedly not environmentally friendly. As a result, other places seek to
promote dense development near transit in order to pursue

73. Id.
74. See, e.g., J. Dennis Doyle, Historic Preservation Zoning in Maryland, 5 MD. L.F. 100, 101–
05 (1976) (explaining the mechanics of historic zoning).
75. See William A. Fischel, Neighborhood Conservation Districts: The New Belt and
Suspenders of Municipal Zoning, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 339, 347–49 (2013) (providing background
information regarding community preservation districts).
76. See Serkin, supra note 45, at 1069 (“[H]istoric preservation is often a kind of rough proxy
for the real concern of preventing displacement of the existing community.”).
77. See id. at 1071–72 (indicating that zoning ordinances are traditionally used to protect
environmental resources such as wetlands).
78. See Serkin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 16) (on file with author).
79. See Serkin, supra note 45, at 1071 (describing the sprawl associated with single-family
residential suburbs and the increased distance from city centers).
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environmental goals.80 Still others use zoning to try to exclude carbonintensive uses, like energy extraction.81 The form therefore varies
tremendously across local governments, but environmental concerns
nevertheless animate zoning in many places.
Exclusion
14. Race. Zoning has been bound up with pernicious racist
exclusion since its very origin.82 The first attempts at zoning in this
country were not to create the use-based zones of the SZEA but were
instead to create racial zoning that sought to segregate explicitly by
race.83 The Supreme Court invalidated that practice very quickly, so
explicit race-based zoning has been squarely unconstitutional for over
a century.84 Nevertheless, zoning in some places remains motivated by
racial hostility.85 Because of the close connection between race and
wealth, some communities seek to exclude affordable, low-income
housing in order to try to exclude minorities.86 Others engage in what
is called “expulsive zoning,” which sites noxious industrial uses in
majority-minority neighborhoods.87 And still others use blight
designations, or other redevelopment strategies, to try to force out inplace minority communities.88 The mechanisms for exclusion and
expulsion are myriad. Zoning, unfortunately, can be deployed to
promote racial segregation and exclusion.

80. Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability and Land Use Planning: Greening State and Local
Land Use Plans and Regulations to Address Climate Change Challenges and Preserve Resources
for Future Generations, 34 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 121, 153 (2009).
81. See Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1203 (N.Y. 2014) (holding that local
governments can zone to exclude oil and gas production within municipal boundaries).
82. See Serkin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 7) (on file with author); see also Christopher
Silver, The Racial Origins of Zoning in American Cities, in URBAN PLANNING AND THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN COMMUNITY: IN THE SHADOWS 23, 24 (June Manning Thomas & Masha Ritzdorf eds.,
1997) (explaining zoning’s origins as a mechanism for excluding “undesirables”).
83. See Gretchen Boger, The Meaning of Neighborhood in the Modern City: Baltimore’s
Residential Segregation Ordinances, 1910–1913, 35 J. URB. HIST. 236, 237 (2009) (describing
Baltimore, Maryland’s residential segregation ordinances as “the first attempt in the United
States to legally separate the living space of blacks and whites”); Garrett Power, Apartheid
Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances of 1910–1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289, 289
(1983) (detailing how the mayor of Baltimore enacted an ordinance in 1911 legalizing
housing segregation).
84. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 69, 82 (1917) (invalidating Louisville, Kentucky’s
segregated housing ordinance on Fourteenth Amendment grounds).
85. Cf. John Infranca, Differentiating Exclusionary Tendencies, 72 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2020) (discussing pernicious and benign uses of zoning).
86. Id. (manuscript at 3–4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3549364
[https://perma.cc/JUE2-8X8U].
87. Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning
in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 742 (1993).
88. E.g., Pritchett, supra note 19, at 47.
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15. Income. Sometimes exclusion is not race based but is instead
income based. Local governments may seek to exclude low-income or
affordable housing in order to try to exclude the poor. 89 This exclusion
is consistent with the objective of maximizing property tax revenue, as
articulated above, but can be based on more invidious distaste. That is,
some local governments may exclude affordable multifamily housing in
order to try to maximize net property taxes, while others may do so
because they simply do not want poor people living nearby.90 This can
be orthogonal to purely economic motives, based instead on prejudices
around crime, social capital, and lifestyle.
16. Marginalized groups. Exclusion, of course, can be directed at
other groups as well. Zoning often seeks to exclude group homes for the
mentally ill, youth rehabilitation facilities, or methadone or other drug
recovery clinics.91 These kinds of uses can have an adverse impact on
local property values if for no other reason than the stigma associated
with them.92 Sometimes, of course, they are associated with increased
criminal activity, or at least the presence of more transient people in
the community, and so are a frequent target of exclusion.93
17. Morality. Zoning is also often directed at other uses for
reasons of moral disapprobation. Adult uses, like strip clubs and adult
bookstores, are often targets of zoning.94 While the First Amendment
quintessentially prohibits regulation based on the substantive content
of expressive activity, the Supreme Court has upheld land use
regulations directed at the secondary effects of adult uses, like crime
prevention.95 But such morality-infused zoning can also target religious
minorities, like efforts to ban a mosque in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. 96

89. See, e.g., S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 734 (N.J.
1975) (holding that local governments could not exclude low income housing from the community).
90. Id. at 723.
91. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985) (discussing exclusion
of a group home); RHJ Med. Ctr., Inc. v. City of DuBois, 754 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726–27 (W.D. Pa.
2010) (discussing exclusion of a methadone clinic).
92. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring).
93. RHJ Med. Ctr., 754 F. Supp. 2d at 739.
94. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 429–30 (2002)
(upholding city ordinance prohibiting operation of multiple adult businesses in a single building).
95. See id. For critiques, see Daniel Linz, Kenneth C. Land, Jay R. Williams, Bryant Paul &
Michael E. Ezell, An Examination of the Assumption that Adult Businesses Are Associated with
Crime in Surrounding Areas: A Secondary Effects Study in Charlotte, North Carolina, 38 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 69 (2004); and Bryant Paul, Daniel Linz & Bradley J. Shafer, Government Regulation
of “Adult” Businesses Through Zoning and Anti-Nudity Ordinances: Debunking the Legal Myth of
Negative Secondary Effects, 6 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 355 (2001).
96. See United States v. Rutherford Cnty., No. 3:12-0737, 2012 WL 2930076, at *2 (M.D.
Tenn. July 18, 2012) (issuing a temporary restraining order to require that the county process a
mosque’s certificate of occupancy).
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C. Contested Land Use
The proliferation of land use goals means that zoning fights have
become particularly difficult to resolve. Proponents and opponents of
development often find themselves talking past each other or having
ulterior motives ascribed to them. Preservationists are branded racists;
developers are labeled community busters.97 Fights splinter and
fragment along many dimensions. 98 Consider the complex relationship
between the interrelated issues of affordability, parochialism,
preservation, and property values.
There is an emerging elite consensus that zoning is too
restrictive in many of America’s thriving cities.99 By limiting the supply
of new development, zoning keeps prices high and therefore out of reach
for many people looking for affordable places to live. 100 The solution,
according to many policymakers and scholars, is to relax zoning
restrictions and allow greater density.101 This will address issues of
equity by allowing more people to access desirable communities.
However, increasing density can change the character of a community
and displace expectations of in-place residents who may have chosen
where to live because of a specific set of characteristics.102 It may reduce
local governments’ ability to control the fiscal impacts of growth. And it
will also tend to put downward pressure on property values (or at least
keep them from increasing quite so quickly).103 Whether this last one is
97. See, e.g., Andrew Keatts, Single-Family Zoning’s Century of Supremacy in San Diego,
VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/land-use/single-fa
mily-zonings-century-of-supremacy-in-san-diego/ [https://perma.cc/J4PQ-BCBH] (“ ‘Exclusionary
zoning, like single-family zoning, is used as a planning tool by local cities around the nation to
segregate Black, Brown and poor residents from wealthier and whiter neighborhoods’ . . . .”);
Dennis McGurk, Letter How to Destroy a City, GLOUCESTER DAILY TIMES, (Aug. 28, 2020),
https://www.gloucestertimes.com/opinion/letters_to_the_editor/letter-how-to-destroy-a-city/article
_7723f24e-cb75-51c2-b6e7-eb88fd184499.html [https://perma.cc/MW3P-URGT] (complaining
about the destructive impact of unchecked development).
98. See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 45, at 1080–85 (describing the complex politics of a
development fight in Nashville’s Music Row).
99. See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman, Morgan Ricks & Christopher Serkin, Regulation and the
Geography of Inequality, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming).
100. See Been et al., supra note 69, at 26 (“[T]he preponderance of evidence suggests that
easing barriers to new construction will moderate price increases and therefore make housing
more affordable to low- and moderate-income families.”).
101. See Edward Glaeser, Reforming Land Use Regulations, BROOKINGS (Apr. 24, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/reforming-land-use-regulations/
[https://perma.cc/9Y7R4YR9] (arguing that land use controls inflate housing prices); Moira O’Neill, Giulia Gualco-Nelson
& Eric Biber, Developing Policy from the Ground Up: Examining Entitlement in the Bay Area to
Inform California’s Housing Policy Debates, 25 HASTINGS ENV’T L.J. 1, 72–74 (2019) (suggesting
that state policymakers change local land-use approval regulations in order to improve
housing production).
102. See Glaeser, supra note 101 (“Restricting growth is often locally popular.”).
103. See supra notes 58–66 and accompanying text.
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a feature or a bug depends on one’s perspective as an aspiring resident
versus an in-place property owner.
There are also externalities to consider. While choosing whether
to upzone a neighborhood may seem like a quintessentially local
decision, the effects of similar decisions within a region can be profound.
For one, restrictions on supply in some “superstar” cities can drive up
prices and thereby reduce the incentive of workers to move to those
places with booming economies.104 Indeed, interregional mobility has
actually declined, even as geographic inequality has increased, because
there is less motivation to move to a place with higher wages if housing
costs will consume most or all of that advantage.105 The resulting
mismatch between labor supply and demand has economic
consequences for the economy as a whole. Some scholars have
calculated a reduction in national GDP of trillions of dollars because of
local zoning decisions restricting housing supply in the nation’s
superstar cities.106
Additionally, zoning often has discriminatory effects and
exacerbates patterns of housing segregation.107 Some of the most bitter
land use fights involve the siting of affordable housing. Affluent
communities in particular will go to sometimes extreme lengths to
prevent the development of affordable housing.108 Simultaneously,
more intensive development, as well as noxious uses, are often
concentrated in minority communities that have fewer resources and

104. Richard Florida, Why America’s Richest Cities Keep Getting Richer, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/04/richard-florida-winner-take-all-new
-urban-crisis/522630/ [https://perma.cc/399Q-AKXC]; see also Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why
Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. Declined?, 102 J. URB. ECON. 76, 89–90 (2017)
(finding that housing price increase affect migration patterns).
105. See Sitaraman et al., supra note 99; see also Florida, supra note 104 (explaining that realestate prices in superstar cities are a key factor in economic inequality).
106. See Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation,
11 AM. ECON. J. 1, 26 n.28 (2019) (indicating that a change in housing supply policy could lead to
a GDP increase of 8.9 percent); see also Space and the City: Poor Land Use in the World’s Greatest
Cities Carries a Huge Cost, ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2015), https://www.economist.com/leaders
/2015/04/04/space-and-the-city [https://perma.cc/H8VQ-CUVQ] (“Lifting all the barriers to urban
growth in America could raise the country’s GDP by between 6.5% and 13.5%, or by about $1
trillion-2 trillion.”).
107. Jessica Trounstine, The Geography of Inequality: How Land Use Regulation Produces
Segregation, 114 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 443, 443 (2020) (discussing the role of zoning in promoting
racial segregation); see also RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY
OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) (describing role of zoning in
housing segregation).
108. See, e.g., Sarah Maslin Nir, For Westchester, 11th Time Is Charm in Fight over Fair
Housing, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/nyregion/westchesterfair-housing-hud-trump.html [https://perma.cc/YUG9-FAW8] (describing Westchester County’s
opposition to affordable housing).
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less ability to resist.109 This combination puts pressure on patterns of
segregation. While nationwide trends show that racial segregation has
decreased somewhat over the last few decades, many places remain
largely segregated.110
Battlegrounds in these fights over density are not limited to
minimum lot sizes and other explicit density restrictions. For example,
parking requirements for new development can regulate density.111
Likewise, historic preservation can be a significant barrier to
development.112 Disputes over historic preservation pit the past,
present, and future against each other in complex configurations of
interests. Often, existing residents invoke historic preservation to
protect the past for future generations but are actually interested in
preserving the existing character of the community for themselves.
Other battlegrounds are larger with more sweeping effects.
Minneapolis and the entire state of Oregon have all but banned singlefamily residential neighborhoods, allowing multifamily development as
of right.113 That is a sea change in conventional zoning, which privileged
single-family housing above all else.
This is just a taste of the complexity of zoning disputes. And
these disputes are usually focused on a single development controversy.
When a local government contemplates rezoning land for some large
new project, proponents and opponents come out of the woodwork
invoking all of these concerns and more. So what is a local government
109. See, e.g., Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice and the
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1012–13 (1993) (indicating
that the Los Angeles County zip code with the largest amount of chemical discharge is 59 percent
African-American); Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1031,
1041 (2003) (“[A]cademics, government agencies, and others undertook systematic studies that
suggested that LULU distributions were correlated with race and income.”).
110. William H. Frey, Black-White Segregation Edges Downward Since 2000, Census Shows,
BROOKINGS (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ the-avenue/2018/12/17/black-whitesegregation-edges-downward-since-2000-census-shows/ [https://perma.cc/TDU4-6KYZ].
111. See, e.g., Joshua Sabatini, Minimum Parking Requirements on Their Way Out in SF, S.F.
EXAMINER (Dec. 4, 2018, 12:00 AM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/minimum-parking-requirementsway-sf/ [https://perma.cc/3KWB-2WRV] (describing how eliminating parking requirements can
make cities more walkable).
112. See David E. Clark & William E. Herrin, Historical Preservation Districts and Home Sale
Prices: Evidence from the Sacramento Housing Market, 27 REV. REG’L STUD. 29, 30 (1997)
(explaining the regulatory hurdles developers must undergo in historic preservation districts); see
also DANIEL KAY HERTZ, THE BATTLE OF LINCOLN PARK: URBAN RENEWAL AND GENTRIFICATION IN
CHICAGO 59 (2018) (describing the role of historic preservation in the gentrification of
Lincoln Park).
113. Will Parker, Does Oregon Have the Answers to High Housing Costs?, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/does-oregon-have-the-answer-to-high-housing-costs-11571823001,
(last updated Oct. 23, 2019, 3:42 PM), [https://perma.cc/ND2B-SE7Q]; Henry Grabar, Minneapolis
Confronts Its History of Housing Segregation, SLATE (Dec. 7, 2018, 4:48 PM), https://slate.com/
business/2018/12/minneapolis-single-family-zoning-housing-racism.html [https://perma.cc/F6SHHHCG].

2020]

THE WICKED PROBLEM OF ZONING

1897

to do? How can local officials manage these conflicting interests and
demands? When local governments are confronted with the wicked
problem of zoning, there is rarely an easy solution.
II. ZONING AND INCREMENTAL CHANGE
One of the hallmarks of wicked problems, as traditionally
formulated, is that they cannot be solved incrementally (if they can be
solved at all).114 Experimentation is impossible (or difficult) because
each small change alters the nature of the problem.115 As Rittel and
Webber explained, “Every solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one-shot
operation’; because there is no opportunity to learn by trial and error,
every attempt counts significantly.”116 Perhaps as a result, most people
working on wicked problems tend to focus on moonshots, or other broad
global solutions.117
This is certainly true in zoning and land use regulation. Scholars
have also proposed a variety of innovations, many of which would
require wholesale change. Professors Rick Hills and David Schleicher,
for example, have proposed adopting a “zoning budget” that would
require downzoning be accompanied by upzoning in other places.118
Professors Elmendorf and Schanske have proposed “auctioning
upzonings” so that local governments can benefit from allowing
increased development.119 Lee Fennell would create an options market
allowing people to hedge against community change,120 and Richard
Epstein would eliminate most land use regulations altogether.121 Such

114. See, e.g., Daviter, supra note 11, at 572 (“This type of policy problem is frequently seen to
defy problem-solving by definition.”).
115. See, e.g., Ian Sanderson, Intelligent Policy Making for a Complex World: Pragmatism,
Evidence and Learning, 57 POL. STUD. 699, 705–06 (2009) (“[E]lements of systems are mutually
dependent, interactions between them are non-linear and therefore the response of the system to
change in one element may be highly disproportionate.”).
116. Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 163.
117. See Daviter, supra note 11, at 574 (“In stark contrast to the widely shared notion that
solving wicked problems is not a viable option, a sizable part of the more recent debate appears to
promote strategies that are designed to accomplish exactly that.”).
118. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget,” 62 CASE W.
RSRV. L. REV. 81, 120 (2011).
119. Christopher S. Elmendorf & Darien Shanske, Auctioning the Upzone, 69 CASE W. RSRV.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
120. Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143,
165–71 (2010).
121. See Richard A. Epstein, A Conceptual Approach to Zoning: What’s Wrong with Euclid, 5
N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 277, 291 (1996) (“Can zoning provide an improvement to the common-law system
in proportion to its increase in costs and delay? I suspect that the answer to this question is
negative . . . .”).
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large-scale solutions have gained little traction, but more modest
changes have their own challenges.
There is a literature on incremental solutions to wicked or
complex problems.122 Some embrace step-by-step solutions, either out of
necessity because of technological limitations or to avoid committing to
a path that turns out to be a mistake.123 Embracing incremental
solutions is therefore usually presented as a kind of compromise: a
second-best approach when a comprehensive solution is out of reach.
The Supreme Court framed the problem precisely this way in
Massachusetts v. EPA, reasoning that agencies cannot “resolve massive
problems in one fell swoop. They instead whittle away at them over
time . . . .”124 Others, however, argue that such incremental approaches
cannot succeed. The very act of whittling can change the nature of the
problem, making it even more difficult to solve.125 In other words,
incremental solutions are never ideal; the question is whether they
make matters worse.
Zoning is different. Incrementalism in this context is not baby
steps towards an elusive solution to the problem of land use regulation.
It is, instead, its own independent virtue. Reframing the purpose of
zoning to focus on regulating the pace of change means that slow
incremental changes to community character are a way of balancing
competing interests.126
Incremental change in this context does not mean the piecemeal
trial and error of zoning through the policy laboratory of states and local
governments. Lessons from San Francisco or New York are not
necessarily applicable to Ames, Iowa or Nashville, Tennessee, let alone
to rural towns in Vermont or Kentucky. The lessons of trials in one place
are not likely to prevent errors in another because contexts are so
different. And land use decisions are not amenable to trial and error

122. See, e.g., Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
79, 79–81 (1959) (arguing for an incremental approach); MICHAEL T. HAYES, INCREMENTALISM AND
PUBLIC POLICY 4 (1992) (discussing Lindblom’s theory of incremental policy change); see also Moira
Zellner & Scott D. Campbell, Planning for Deep-Rooted Problems: What Can We Learn from
Aligning Complex Systems and Wicked Problems?, 16 PLAN. THEORY & PRAC. 457, 465 (2015)
(describing the literature on incremental solutions).
123. See generally Daviter, supra note 11, at 571–87 (discussing strategies of coping, taming,
and solving).
124. 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007) (citation omitted); see also Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 10, at 65
(describing the process of “whittling away” at wicked problems).
125. See, e.g., Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 165 (criticizing incrementalism and arguing
that it “may result in making things worse, because it may become more difficult to deal with the
higher problems. Marginal improvement does not guarantee overall improvement.”).
126. See Serkin, supra note 9.
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because regulatory changes trigger development decisions that are not
easily undone. The built environment constrains subsequent change.127
Incrementalism, instead, refers to a particular local
government’s use of zoning to ensure that development in a
neighborhood occurs at an appropriate pace given the local context.
Regulating the pace of change is a way of balancing the expectations of
stability with the competing needs of dynamism and change.128 This
focus on pace of change is usually missing from land use fights.
Consider a typical fight over some proposed new development
that will reconfigure the use of some swath of land. In suburbs and
exurbs, imagine the conversion of agricultural land to a new
condominium development. In an urban setting, imagine the infill
redevelopment of an old industrial building into a large mixed-use
tower. In either case, local residents will often object. They may dislike
the change in aesthetics. They may worry about the change in
population or demographics—often, a euphemism for race—or they may
worry about increased burdens on local infrastructure, like roads and
schools. And, fundamentally, they often worry about changes in the
character of the community.
Time, however, is important. Change that happens quickly is
more disruptive to expectations than change that happens slowly, even
if the end results are the same.129 Indeed, there are a number of
property doctrines that serve to incorporate slow changes but resist
quick ones. Consider, for example, the arcane common law rules
governing accretion and avulsion. Where property boundaries are
defined by water—either a river or the ocean—those boundaries are
fluid.130 Rivers and shorelines change through the slow process of
accretion and erosion.131 And where that occurs, the legal property lines
shift, sometimes expanding and sometimes shrinking the area of
someone’s land.132 On the shoreline, for example, the boundary between
public and private land is defined as the mean high-water line, a

127. See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 829 (2009) (“In addition
to its complexity, land has memory. Changes that human beings make to the land have a tendency
to remain in place until they are affirmatively removed.”).
128. See generally Serkin, supra note 9.
129. See Serkin, supra note 15.
130. Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23
TUL. ENV’T L.J. 305, 306 (2009) (“The law provides that when the water’s edge shifts ‘gradually
and imperceptibly’ (accretion), the property boundary moves with it.” (footnote omitted)).
131. Phillip Wm. Lear, Accretion, Reliction, Erosion, and Avulsion: A Survey of Riparian and
Littoral Title Problems, 11 J. ENERGY NAT. RES. & ENV’T L. 265, 275–76 (1991) (discussing the
effects of accretion and erosion upon land boundaries).
132. See id. (explaining the “universal rule” that the owner of the bank or shore becomes the
owner of “accreted lands” while also risking the loss of land due to erosion).
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natural phenomenon that can change over time.133 Accretion will extend
the private lot out towards the sea, and erosion will do the opposite.
Occasionally, however, that boundary changes quickly and
dramatically, like in a hurricane or a flood. Where the process is not
slow accretion but is instead dramatic “avulsion,” the rules are
different, and legal property lines will resist the ecological change.134
The property owner (or the government) can push the river back to its
preavulsive course or the shoreline back into place. Professor Sax, in
his leading writing on this subject, found the distinction between
accretion and avulsion inexplicable.135 Why, he asked, should it matter
whether the change happens all at once or gradually? The end result is
the same, and the law should not distinguish between them. 136 But it
does matter because changes that occur gradually are more easily
incorporated into expectations.
People are often wrong about what will bother them in the future
and do not accurately predict how quickly they will adjust to change.137
Faced with some large new development next door, neighbors often
react with hostility, imagining that they will wake up every morning
mortified by the changes to the neighborhood. They imagine some new
eyesore blocking the horizon and changing the character of the
community; one day, they live in their bucolic neighborhood surrounded
by people they know, and the next day they do not. That would, indeed,
be jarring and dislocating. But they are likely to be wrong.
One extreme example is the fight over Atlantic Yards in
Brooklyn, New York, an expansive uncovered rail yard in the heart of
downtown Brooklyn.138 In order to spur revitalization in the area, New
York City partnered with a developer, Bruce Ratner, to develop the
entire area, including the construction of the Barclay’s Center to house
the Brooklyn (then New Jersey) Nets basketball team, massive new
residential towers, hundreds of thousands of square feet of commercial

133. Sax, supra note 130, at 306.
134. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., v. Fla. Dep’t. of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 709 (2010)
(“[W]hen a new strip of land has been added to the shore by avulsion, the littoral owner has no
right to subsequent accretions.”).
135. See Sax, supra note 130, at 351 (describing the doctrinal “accretion/avulsion” distinction
as a problem that leads to disputes).
136. Id. (“[The distinction between accretion and avulsion] will doubtless arise repeatedly in
sea level-rise controversies, and it continues to generate a good deal of wasteful litigation, with
pointless and expensive lay and expert testimony, and dispute over distinctions that ought to make
no difference.”).
137. See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 92 (2006) (indicating that humans often
incorrectly imagine future events).
138. See Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urb. Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 165–66 (N.Y. 2009)
(describing the Atlantic Yards development).
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office space, and other elements.139 The envisioned changes to the
neighborhood were dramatic. And it engendered commensurate
opposition. Legal and political battles broke out, challenging the use of
eminent domain, the bidding process, and the new vision for the area.140
A local theater company produced a musical detailing the community
outrage.141 Local protests spread throughout the city and even the
country. “Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn” T-shirts popped up
everywhere, hipster status symbols objecting to the scale of the
development and the gentrification it was sure to bring.
Retelling that story is not important here. What is important is
what happened afterwards. Many of the opponents’ pessimistic
predictions in fact came to pass. Promises to include affordable and
inclusionary housing turned ephemeral.142 Gentrification dramatically
changed the mix of nearby commercial uses. 143 Property values
increased. And yet, ten years later, the development has become just
part of the city’s background. Neighbors may still get annoyed on
hockey night, but many nearby residents—including some of the most
ardent opponents—now no longer notice the changes the development
brought. Certainly, some communities were displaced, and other harms
are simply invisible. But the hysteria has largely disappeared, and
some have even embraced the space.144 Given enough time, neighbors’
expectations adapted to the new urban landscape.
139. See id.
140. See Charles V. Bagli, $3 Million Deal Ends a Holdout in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21,
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/nyregion/22yards.html [https://perma.cc/NV33-V6SV]
(describing the history of the opposition to the Atlantic Yards project).
141. See Melena Ryzik, In Brooklyn, Dramatizing Real Discord, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/theater/10footprint.html
[https://perma.cc/4PZQ-SUZN]
(“[The show] is based on interviews with business owners, neighbors, politicians, bloggers and
activists touched by Atlantic Yards, the developer Bruce Ratner’s divisive project to reconfigure 22
acres of urban landscape in Brooklyn, displacing scores of residents and small businesses in
the process.”).
142. See Norman Oder, Brooklyn Lawmakers Seek Pacific Park Affordable Housing Schedule,
BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE (June 4, 2019), https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/2019/06/04/pacific-park
-affordable-housing-schedule/ [https://perma.cc/M6RK-PNC3] (describing promised affordable
housing units in Atlantic Yards); Norman Oder, Ever-Shifting Pacific Park Plan Highlights
Uncertainty of Big Development Schemes, CITY LIMITS (Apr. 3, 2019), https://citylimits.org/2019/
04/03/ever-shifting-pacific-park-plan-highlights-uncertainty-of-big-development-schemes/
[https://perma.cc/C6WR-9RPJ] (describing delays and uncertainty surrounding the building of
affordable housing units in Atlantic Yards).
143. See, e.g., Paul Leonard, ‘This Arena Is a Gentrifying Machine’: Atlantic Yards Critics Rally
at Barclays, PATCH (Sept. 28, 2012, 5:21 PM), https://patch.com/new-york/fortgreene/this-arena-isa-gentrifying-machine-atlantic-yards-cr29603c7696 [https://perma.cc/38DG-ET22] (indicating
that the Atlantic Yards project accelerated gentrification in Brooklyn).
144. See, e.g., Andy Newman, How a Once-Loathed Brooklyn Arena Became a Protest
Epicenter, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3fwiG5w [https://perma.cc/9K9B-BPW9]
(describing how the controversial Barclays plaza in Atlantic Yards became a center point of the
community’s Black Lives Matter protests).
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This adaptability to change is backed by psychological literature.
A number of studies of consumer behavior have demonstrated that
humans do not do a very good job predicting future happiness and
unhappiness.145 People expect that some new purchase will bring them
joy, and while it may momentarily,146 such emotions tend to be much
more fleeting than people expect.147 The same is true of harms.148
Studies of hedonic adaption suggest that people adjust to new
realities—including even catastrophic injuries—more quickly than they
might predict.149
This does not mean that people’s preferences or objections
should simply be ignored. Housing advocates can point to examples like
Atlantic Yards and argue that people will adapt to change, so their
hostility should be ignored in the planning process. That argument goes
too far, however, because the harm is real even if impermanent.
Community transitions impose costs, and regulating the pace of change
can minimize those costs.
One of the leading justifications for local control over property
taxation and spending comes from the pioneering work of Charles
Tiebout in the 1950s.150 In his famous Tiebout Hypothesis, he explored
whether and why to expect local governments to provide efficient levels
of public services in the absence of a price signal.151 That is, one might
expect that local governments’ ability to impose an involuntary
property tax might lead to the oversupply of municipal services, with
local governments providing benefits that people do not, in fact, value.
Tiebout demonstrated, however, that the ability of consumers to vote

145. See, e.g., Elizabeth W. Dunn, Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, If Money Doesn’t
Make You Happy, Then You Probably Aren’t Spending It Right, 21 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 115, 115
(2011) (“When people make predictions about the hedonic consequences of future events they are
said to be making affective forecasts, and a sizeable literature shows that these forecasts are
often wrong.”).
146. Dave Fagundes, Why Less Property Is More: Inclusion, Dispossession, & Subjective Wellbeing, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1378 (2018).
147. Id.
148. Sean Hannon Williams, Self-Altering Injury: The Hidden Harms of Hedonic Adaptation,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 539–40 (2011).
149. See, e.g., Fagundes, supra note 146, at 1378 (describing how quickly people adjust to new
possessions and become conscious of the downsides of their new acquisitions); Yang Yang & Jeff
Galak, Sentimental Value and Its Influence on Hedonic Adaptation, 109 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 767, 769 (2015) (noting that hedonic adaptation can also apply to life-changing events
like incarceration).
150. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
417–20 (1956).
151. See Christopher Serkin, Capitalization and Exclusionary Zoning, in MEASURING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF REAL ESTATE REGULATION: I NTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 15, 21 (Ronit
Levine-Schnur ed., 2020) (explaining that, according to the Tiebout Hypothesis, people will vote
with their feet and choose to live where their preferences are best satisfied).

2020]

THE WICKED PROBLEM OF ZONING

1903

with their feet can operate as an essential restraint on government
taxing and spending.152 He hypothesized that people choose where to
live based on the specific taxes and services that a location offers.153 In
his model, people could choose between an infinite number of local
governments, at which point he predicted that people would sort into
perfectly homogenous enclaves.154 Subsequent work extended his model
into heterogenous places, demonstrating that the capitalization of
property taxes and services into property values can still produce the
same kind of outcome.155 The result is that this form of foot voting
serves as a central justification for local control and an important
mechanism for satisfying people’s preferences.156
The Tiebout Hypothesis depends, however, on stability in local
taxes and spending priorities—in short, on stability in the character of
the local government.157 Changes in the mix can mean that housing
consumers who selected a place for one set of characteristics may find
that the place changes over time, sometimes dramatically. Their
choices, then, are to suffer the disutility of living in a place that no
longer meets their priorities or to incur the costs of moving. Both are
costly. Zoning can help protect the interests of housing consumers who
selected a place for a particular set of characteristics by constraining
the pace of change.158 This is zoning simply as a brake on change, not
in the service of any particular agenda.
III. ENACTING INCREMENTALISM
People resist fast change more than slow, accretive change.
Opposition to development is often based, in part, on concerns over the
next project—the slippery slope of community change. People often
unreasonably expect zoning to protect the status quo and prevent all
change to neighborhood character. But they are reasonably concerned
if local officials grant variances or reasonings too easily, undermining

152. See id. at 21–22 (describing the model Tiebout created for the Tiebout Hypothesis).
153. Tiebout, supra note 150, at 418.
154. See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 63, at 1659 (“Given an infinite supply of jurisdictions and
total elasticity in the housing market, the Tiebout Hypothesis predicts perfect sorting by
homeowners and, thus, a perfectly efficient system.”).
155. See generally Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending
on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J.
POL. ECON. 957, 968 (1969) (demonstrating that an increase in property taxes unaccompanied by
an increase in public services will depress property values).
156. See ILYA SOMIN, FREE TO MOVE: FOOT VOTING, MIGRATION, AND POLITICAL
FREEDOM (2020).
157. See Serkin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 24) (on file with author).
158. Serkin, supra note 151, at 22–23.
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stability in expectations. A useful focus, then, is on zoning tools that
regulate the pace of change.
The first and most obvious tool is concurrency, or adequate
public facilities ordinances.159 Concurrency is a land use regime that
imposes phased expectations of growth.160 Adopted most notably in
Florida in the 1980s, concurrency was designed to ensure that
development did not outpace infrastructure capacity.161 In essence, a
concurrency regime requires local governments to plan for reasonable
expansions of infrastructure, like roads and wastewater (or even
schools), and then limit development in any given year to levels
consistent with those infrastructure plans.162 Importantly, however,
developers could buy their way out of concurrency caps by paying
directly for additional infrastructure capacity.163 For example, a
municipality might plan for extending sewer lines to an area to serve
five hundred additional housing units, to be paid from general property
tax revenue. If a developer wanted to build one thousand units (or any
additional units once the five hundred new ones had already been
permitted), the developer would have to pay a kind of impact fee to
expand the sewer beyond what had been planned.164
The purpose of concurrency was not to limit growth for the sake
of preserving community character. Rather, it was to bring a degree of
rationality and planning to infrastructure buildout.165 It also served
fiscal purposes, forcing developers to shoulder some of the cost of

159. See Jamie Baker Roskie & Janna Blasingame Custer, Adequate Public Facilities
Ordinances: A Comparison of Their Use in Georgia and North Carolina, 15 SE. ENV’T L.J. 345,
346–47 (2007) (describing adequate public facilities ordinances); S. Mark White & Elisa L. Paster,
Creating Effective Land Use Regulations Through Concurrency, 43 NAT. RES. J. 753, 754–57 (2003)
(describing concurrency regulations).
160. Rossi & Serkin, supra note 59, at 673.
161. See, e.g., David L. Powell, Recent Changes in Concurrency, FLA. BAR J., Nov. 1994, at 67,
67 (“[Concurrency] seeks to ensure that infrastructure is ready when needed. Concurrency is the
‘teeth’ of Florida’s growth management system.”); Timothy S. Chapin, Local Governments as Policy
Entrepreneurs: Evaluating Florida’s “Concurrency Experiment,” 42 URB. AFFS. REV. 505, 507, 519–
27 (2007) (providing a summary of Florida’s concurrency practices).
162. See Susan L. Trevarthen & Chad Friedman, Senate Bill 360: Growth Management Reform
Arrives and It Is All About Infrastructure, FLA. BAR J., Oct. 2005, at 39, 40 (2005) (“In the mid- to
late-90s, the legislature enacted a series of provisions that ultimately created a statutory option
for school concurrency and an optional school facilities element.”).
163. Robert M. Rhodes, Florida Growth Management: Past, Present, Future, 9 FLA. COASTAL
L. REV. 107, 118 (2007); see also Kacie A. Hohnadell, Note, Community Planning Act: The End of
Meaningful Growth Management in Florida, 42 STETSON L. REV. 715, 724–25 (2013) (explaining
how concurrency provisions require developers to provide necessary infrastructure or pay a fee to
ensure that facilities meet a designated level of service).
164. Hohnadell, supra note 163, at 725.
165. See Rossi & Serkin, supra note 59, at 673–74 (describing concurrency).
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infrastructure expansion beyond that which was preplanned.166
Although, this of course created perverse incentives for local officials to
adopt infrastructure planning that was too conservative precisely to
shift those costs.167
Nevertheless, concurrency (and the related adequate public
facilities doctrines) is one of the few land use regimes that focuses
explicitly on the pace of change, not simply on the amount of change.168
As a result, concurrency can be easily repurposed to ensure that growth
does not outpace community expectations for stability instead of merely
infrastructure capacity. Local governments should engage in planning
not just around the amount of development to permit but also the
timing of that development in order to navigate the thin path between
encouraging development and protecting stability.
The risk, of course, is that when municipalities adopt plans for
growth, they will plan for much too little growth. They will err on the
side of protecting expectations of in-place owners and will do very little
to address the acute problems that restrictive zoning can create.169
There must be a stick as well as a carrot. Courts and state legislatures
have developed many approaches to this problem, from builder
remedies to assigning fair share obligations.170 There is no need to
rehash those here, and most have proven ineffectual or problematic.171
But states have the power to force deals.172 They could, for example,
threaten more sweeping land use reforms if local officials fail to plan for
166. Hohnadell, supra note 163, at 725 (“In effect, the concurrency system required developers
to help pay for the facilities, schools, and roads needed to accommodate the growth generated by
their projects so that local governments would not be stuck footing the entire bill.”).
167. Id. at 726.
168. See Thomas G. Pelham, From the Ramapo Plan to Florida’s Statewide Concurrency
System: Ramapo’s Influence on Infrastructure Planning, 35 URB. LAW. 113, 113 (2003) (describing
concurrency’s origins in Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972), which
involved “the first comprehensive system to integrate local capital improvements activities and
the local land planning and regulatory process by coordinating the timing and phasing of
development with the provision of public facilities.”).
169. See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 40, at 80–81 (discussing local incentives to zone
too restrictively).
170. See, e.g., S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 732–33 (N.J.
1975) (holding that municipalities must provide their “fair share” of a region’s needs for decent
and adequate low and moderate income housing).
171. See, e.g., Katrin C. Rowan, Anti-exclusionary Zoning in Pennsylvania: A Weapon for
Developers, A Loss for Low-Income Pennsylvanians, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1271, 1299–300 (2007)
(“When developers surreptitiously propose to build multifamily housing or mobile homes, in hopes
that the municipality will agree to single-family homes instead, developers seize on fears that lowincome people will inhabit the wealthy suburbs by ‘wav[ing] the bloody flag of affordable housing.’ ”
(quoting Diane Mastrull & Evan Halper, Land-Use Battles Frustrate Pa. Towns, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Mar. 12, 2000, at A1)).
172. Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 YALE L.J.
954, 957–58 (2019).
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adequate change, eliminating single-family zoning or allowing
increased density as of right.173 In-place property owners and the local
officials responsive to them might well prefer a kind of phased growth
model to losing control altogether. The details are beyond the scope of
this short essay. The point is simply that concurrency regimes provide
a model for regulating the pace as well as the amount of growth.
Likewise, the idea of a “zoning budget,” set forth by Professors
Rick Hills and David Schleicher, can be conscripted to the pace of
change.174 As they insightfully argued, local officials typically consider
zoning decisions piecemeal.175 Given the concentrated interests of
neighbors in resisting nearby development, local officials often bend to
pressure to down-zone property without regard for the overall
systemwide effects of too many down-zonings.176 Hills and Schleicher
therefore proposed a zoning budget, according to which each downzoning would have to be accompanied by a corresponding up-zoning
elsewhere.177 This creates meaningful interest groups aligned on both
sides of every rezoning and forces local officials to consider some of the
systemwide consequences of their individual land use decisions. 178
Hills and Schleicher, however, suggest that each local
government be forced to adopt a zoning budget annually.179 They
advocate an independent agency, like a local planning commission, to
set an annual budget.180 That commission would be charged with
“devising a ratio of up-zonings to down-zonings in light of its zoning
‘budget.’ ”181 This focus on an annual budget makes sense if the concern
is responding to dynamic changes in development pressures.182 It
makes less sense, however, if the focus is expanded to include the value
of protecting community stability. A longer-term apparatus needs to be
developed for that purpose. Multiyear, intertemporal bargains over the
pace of change require zoning budgets lasting beyond a single year.
Imagine, for example, a ten- or fifteen-year zoning budget, anticipating
growth and requiring accommodations for development and change but
giving local officials the ability to decide when that change will occur
within that long budget cycle. Maybe the dynamic would be the same
173. See Parker, supra note 113 (describing restrictions on single-family zones in Oregon); cf.
Davidson, supra note 172, at 964–72 (discussing the opportunities and risks of state preemption).
174. Hills & Schleicher, supra note 118, at 120.
175. Id. at 86.
176. Id. at 86–87.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 125–26.
179. Id. at 124–25.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 125.
182. Id. at 124–25.
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as with municipal debt, and local officials would push development off
as long as possible, burdening the future to protect their own
interests.183 But if people (voters, homeowners) recognize the benefits
of incremental change—the ability to adapt to new development, the
opportunity to revisit planning decisions in light of changes on the
ground, and so forth—then local officials might try to spread the costs
out over time. At the very least, a longer time horizon for zoning budgets
could help in managing the pace of change.
Finally, courts could factor in the pace of change when
evaluating local zoning decisions. Typically, the proliferation of
development in a community is viewed as a reason to allow more
development.184 A number of land use tests—whether under
constitutional, statutory, or judge-made rules—focus on the treatment
of others in the community.185 The obvious concern is treating similarly
situated property owners alike, and courts tend to worry if one property
owner is allowed to develop in ways that a similarly situated neighbor
is not.186 But perhaps this is wrong or, at least, incomplete.
Other developments in a neighborhood are reasons not to allow
an additional project too quickly out of concern for community members’
expectations. The goal is to phase change in more slowly. Courts should
look at the extent of community change and put a thumb on the scale
against additional development if change is occurring quickly. How fast
is too fast when it comes to neighborhood transformation? That depends
on issues like the transience of the community, the extent of existing
owners’ expectations around dynamism and change, local and regional
development pressures, and the like. There is no set formula. But the
point here is simply that courts can and should examine how quickly a
neighborhood is changing when evaluating legal challenges to
new development.

183. See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 906–07 (2011) (explaining the dynamics around
municipal debt).
184. See, e.g., Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 844, 846–48 (11th Cir. 2008)
(invalidating efforts to exclude new commercial development on grounds that area had already
been developed and lacked small-town feel).
185. See, e.g., Twigg v. Cnty. of Will, 627 N.E.2d 742, 745 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (focusing on
compatibility of zoning with surrounding uses).
186. This is clearest in the context of Equal Protection challenges to zoning. See, e.g.,
Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Twp., 309 F.3d 120, 137 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[I]f, the entities are
similarly situated, then the city must justify its different treatment of the two . . . .”).
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CONCLUSION
Zoning is a wicked problem. The contested stakes, the absence
of clear goals, and the dynamic interactions between interest groups
make land use a seemingly inevitable battleground as local officials
pursue the competing goals of affordability, community preservation,
environmental protection, economic gains, and others. But at least
some of these fights can be avoided—or the vehemence diminished—if
zoning is deployed to manage the pace of neighborhood change, instead
of the product (or goal) of end-state planning. Using zoning to allow,
and even encourage, regular but incremental change ensures a measure
of dynamism while also protecting the expectations of in-place owners—
expectations that adapt more easily to slow and steady changes than to
quick, avulsive ones. This is not incrementalism because of the
difficulty of global solutions. Instead, when it comes to land use
regulations, slow and steady change is itself a kind of solution to the
wicked problem of zoning.

